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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback on individuals’ 
performance, under two incentive schemes.  In a laboratory setup, agents perform a real-
effort task. We show that relative performance feedback increases performance when 
performance is related to pay (piece-rate) but has no effect on performance when pay is 
independent of performance (flat-rate). These effects are independent of the agent’s 
relative position. Subjects are also asked to rate their satisfaction during the experiment. 
We find that under flat-rate, feedback has no effect on agents’ satisfaction, while under 
piece-rate, feedback about relative position affects satisfaction.  
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1.  Introduction 
Performance appraisals have become standard practice in organizations. 
Informing agents about how well they are performing relative to their peers—that is, 
providing workers with relative performance feedback—is a common method of 
implementing performance appraisals. Given its widespread use, it is important to 
understand the consequences of providing relative performance feedback. Managerial 
economics and social psychology have devoted quite a lot of attention to the study of 
performance appraisals (see Bretz et al., 1992, and Levy et al., 2004, for reviews). 
Research in economics, however, has paid little attention to relative performance 
feedback and its effects.  
This paper studies the provision of relative performance feedback under two 
relevant incentive schemes: performance-related pay (piece-rate incentives) and fixed 
pay, independent of performance (flat-rate incentives). We examine whether there are 
differences in the response to feedback under the different payment mechanisms. In 
order to understand the extent of feedback’s effectiveness, we study the influence of 
feedback on agents’ emotional state (or level of satisfaction). Moreover, given that, in 
practice, feedback is rarely provided only once, we investigate the effects of its 
provision over time. By exploring all of these dimensions, we provide a comprehensive 
empirical analysis of the effects of relative performance feedback and study the 
channels through which it is effective. 
We propose a controlled laboratory setup in which subjects perform a real-effort 
task and are rewarded according to piece-rate or flat-rate incentives. There are four 
working periods. Between periods, the control subjects are provided with their absolute 
performance, while the treated subjects are provided with their absolute performance 
and with the average performance in the session. Once feedback is provided, both 
control and treated subjects’ satisfaction is elicited via questions about their happiness, 
arousal and dominance levels.1  
With respect to performance, under piece-rate incentives, we find that relative 
performance feedback had a strong and positive effect on individual performance, even 
after controlling for individual characteristics, such as ability. Those subjects who 
received relative performance feedback increased their performance by 17 percent 
compared to those who did not. In contrast, under flat-rate incentives, we find that the 
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 See Figure 1 for a graphical presentation of the experiment. 
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feedback does not affect subjects’ performance. Interestingly, control subjects perform 
similarly under both incentive schemes, but relative performance feedback affects 
performance only when payment is related to performance. One may argue that when 
pay is related to performance, the information is “relevant,” and individuals react 
because relative performance information has consequences in terms of relative income 
(i.e., strong effect under piece-rate but insignificant effect under flat-rate incentives).  
With regard to the dynamic effects of providing relative performance feedback 
(under piece-rate incentives), we find that in all periods, the treated subjects outperform 
the untreated, although the effect becomes weaker over time. In addition, the content of 
the feedback (i.e., positive (negative) feedback when agents are informed that they are 
performing above (below) the average) does not affect subjects’ subsequent 
performance differently since all subjects increase their performance.  
When studying satisfaction, we find that the incentive scheme matters. Under 
piece-rate incentives, relative performance feedback had strong effects on both 
happiness and dominance levels. Contrary to the findings on performance, we show that 
the treatment had very different effects on those who received positive versus negative 
feedback. We find that receiving positive (negative) feedback affects subjects’ 
happiness and dominance levels positively (negatively), such that when we consider 
only the overall treatment effect, the opposite signs cancel out. With respect to 
happiness, between those performing above and below the group average, the relative 
feedback leads to a seven-percentage-point increase in the gap (or inequality) of 
subjects’ happiness. With respect to dominance levels, the increase in inequality is eight 
percentage points. Moreover, the inequality in both happiness and dominance increases 
over time with cumulative information. We do not see any effect of relative 
performance feedback on satisfaction under flat-rate incentives. This indicates that such 
feedback affects individuals’ emotional state only when this information has 
consequences in terms of relative income (i.e., under piece-rate).  
These findings on performance and emotional response are consistent with a 
competitive-preferences framework in which individuals care about income 
comparisons. Individuals get extra utility from knowing that they earn more than others 
and disutility when they learn that they earn less than others—i.e., individuals have 
competitive preferences.  
The findings from this paper have important implications for understanding 
whether or not an organization would choose to provide relative performance feedback. 
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We show that there are very strong effects on performance when performance is linked 
to payment. This implies a strong incentive for an organization to employ this 
mechanism, especially because the cost to implement it is negligible. However, we go 
beyond the conventional thinking on this issue to highlight that this mechanism, while 
very effective at increasing performance, also has important consequences for 
individuals’ affective state or satisfaction. 
Understanding how agents feel when they receive relative performance feedback 
is important, as it sheds light on when the information is relevant to the agent. Bowles 
(1998) argues that “economic institutions structure the tasks people face and hence 
influence not only their capacities but their values and psychological functioning as 
well.” In recent years, along with more-traditional outcome variables, economists and 
managers have started to give more weight to individuals’ happiness as an important 
outcome variable. Individuals’ well-being has been linked with economic outcomes. For 
example, labor-market studies that include broader measures than happiness have found 
that workers’ psyches are correlated with their morale and motivation, as well as with 
other relevant issues such as firms’ retention ability (see Bewley, 1999).2 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a review of the existing 
literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures in detail. Section 
4 provides a theoretical framework of thinking about the expected effects. In Section 5, 
we present the raw results via tables and figures. Sections 6 and 7 include the regression 
analysis, quantifying the main treatment effects under piece-rate and fat-rate incentives, 
respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
 
2.  Related Literature  
The provision of feedback on individual effort—under either piece-rate or flat-
rate incentives—has recently been studied in several environments. Under piece-rate, 
Hannan et al. (2008), using a laboratory experiment without real effort, Azmat and 
Iriberri (2010) in an educational setup, and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) in a firm 
setting, find that the provision of feedback has a positive effect on performance. In 
contrast, Eriksson et al. (2009), in the laboratory with real effort, find that although 
feedback does not affect performance, it increases the mistake rate of the worst-
performing agent. Under flat-rate incentives, Kuhnen and Tymula (2012) study the    
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 Kahneman et al. (1999), Loewenstein (2000), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Krueger (2005) and McFadden 
(2005) provide recent overviews of research on happiness and its relation to economics. 
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effect of feedback in relation to individuals’ expectations of their relative performance 
and find that subjects exert more effort and expect to rank better when they are told that 
they may learn their ranking.3 Our paper contributes to this literature on the effect of 
feedback on performance by explicitly comparing the effect of relative performance 
feedback under both piece-rate and flat-rate incentives, a comparison that the existing 
literature does not make. This allows us to disentangle individuals’ responses to relative 
income versus relative performance comparisons.  
In contrast with piece-rate or flat-rate incentives, under tournament incentives, 
relative performance feedback can be informative on the probability of winning the 
tournament, such that individuals are, indeed, expected to react to this information. 
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009), Young et al. (1993), Muller and Schotter 
(2010), Hannan et al. (2008), Fehr and Ederer (2007) and Eriksson et al. (2009) perform 
empirical tests on the effect of providing relative performance feedback in tournaments. 
The evidence is mixed. While some authors find that the provision of such feedback 
increases the effort of all participants, others find that the leading participants slack off, 
while those who are lagging behind give up. In our paper, the focus is only on piece-rate 
and flat-rate incentives, abstracting from a competitive-environment setting in which 
feedback is informative of one’s own payoff.  
It is important to note that in our setting, relative performance information is 
provided privately, which distinguishes it from settings in which pure peer effects or 
status-seeking effects play a role. Peer effects—that is, observing others’ work and/or 
being observed—has shown to be effective in changing individuals’ choice of efforts 
(see, for example, Falk and Ichino, 2006, and Mas and Moretti, 2009).  When relative 
performance feedback is publicly available, status-seeking concerns may arise (see, for 
example, Charness et al., 2010, in which individuals can make investments to improve 
their own performance or sabotage others’ performance).  
The literature on the effects of feedback on affective response is relatively 
scarce.4 To understand how relative comparisons affect happiness, Charness and 
Grosskopf (2001) use a dictator-type experimental design to test whether there is a 
relationship between a person’s happiness and the weight she attaches to relative 
payoffs. They do not find support for the hypothesis that happiness levels are inversely 
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 Recently, Bandiera et al. (2009) and Delfgaauw et al. (2013) also considered the impact of relative 
performance feedback at the team level. 
4
 Kahneman et al. (1999), Loewenstein (2000), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Krueger (2005) and McFadden 
(2005) provide recent overviews of research on happiness and its relation to economics. 
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related to a preoccupation with relative payoffs. Brandts et al. (2009) study, in the 
laboratory, the effect of a competitive environment on happiness and find that 
competition leads to increased inequality in happiness between subjects who are chosen 
to participate and those who are excluded during the competition. In a recent field study, 
Card et al. (2012) find that disclosing information on peers’ salaries affects their job 
satisfaction, such that workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and 
occupation report lower job satisfaction, while those earning above the median report no 
higher satisfaction. Our paper is the first to look at the effect of relative performance 
feedback on agents’ affective response in a controlled environment.  
Overall, our study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, we 
go beyond the effect of relative performance feedback on individual performance by 
also analyzing the effect on individuals’ affective response. Second, we compare the 
effect of relative performance feedback under two commonly used incentive schemes, 
piece-rate and flat-rate, allowing us to disentangle the effect of relative income feedback 
from that of relative performance feedback on both performance and affective response. 
 
3.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
Sixteen experimental sessions were conducted in the Laboratori d’Economia 
Experimental (LEEX) at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, using z-Tree experimental software 
(Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 316 subjects, 20 per session, were recruited using the 
ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004), ensuring that subjects had not participated in 
similar experiments in our laboratory in the past. Between April and May 2009, we 
conducted eight sessions (160 subjects) under the piece-rate scheme, and in February 
2010, the remaining eight sessions under the flat-rate scheme (156 subjects).5 A sheet 
with general, identical instructions was distributed and read aloud after all subjects had 
arrived. These instructions are in the Appendix. Subjects were guaranteed a three-euros 
show-up fee. Throughout the experiment, the subjects were seated in cubicles so that 
they could not observe other subjects’ screens. Once the experiment had concluded, 
while they waited to be paid, subjects filled out a questionnaire that requested 
demographic details.6 We use these details as control variables in the econometric 
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 All sessions had 20 participants, except for two sessions under flat-rate, where only18 subjects showed 
up. 
6
 All sessions, treated and control, were mixed in terms of gender. Consistent with the gender composition 
of the subject pool at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, there were slightly more female than male subjects (39% 
men and 61% women).  
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analysis. The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. Subjects were paid 
individually and in private, using a sealed envelope. Each experimental session lasted 
one hour.    
Figure 1 shows the timeline of the experiment, which consisted of four working 
periods of five minutes each. During each period, subjects were presented with the same 
summations of four randomly generated numbers of two digits each, for which they 
were asked to submit an answer.7  
Half of the subjects, 160, were rewarded according to their performance—that 
is, the number of correctly solved summations. More specifically, subjects were paid 
0.15 euros for each correctly submitted answer (piece-rate incentives). All four working 
periods counted equally, and the total payment depended on the number of correctly 
solved summations during the four periods. (See Section 6 for the results under piece-
rate.) The other 160 subjects were rewarded according to a fixed wage of 15 euros, 
which was independent of their performance (flat-rate incentives). (See Section 7 for the 
results under flat-rate).  
At the end of each working period, four times during the experiment, subjects 
could rest for two minutes while they were given feedback. After the two minutes with 
the feedback information, they were asked to answer three questions included in the 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) by Lang (1980). We will proceed to explain the 
feedback, as well as the SAM questionnaire. 
The treatment variable of interest is the feedback about performance, which was 
provided at the end of each period. Half of the subjects (80 subjects under piece-rate and 
78 subjects under flat-rate)—the control group—were provided with information about 
their correct number of summations. We refer to this as absolute performance. The 
other half (80 subjects under piece-rate and 78 subjects under flat-rate)—the treatment 
group—were provided not only with information about their correct number of 
summations, but also with the average correct number of summations within the 
experimental session. Therefore, subjects in the treatment group could observe whether 
they performed better or worse than the average, as well as their distance from this 
average. We refer to this information as the relative performance feedback. It is 
important to note that all subjects, both in the treatment and control groups, had 
                                                 
7
 Many experimental papers have used summations as a real-effort task since they combine both ability 
and effort. See, for example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Eriksson et al. (2009). 
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received an explanation of the type of feedback they would get (see instructions in the 
Appendix).8  
 The SAM questionnaire, which is commonly used in social psychology, 
measures the affective response to a task. It consists of three sets of five pictures each, 
as shown in Figure 2. The top set measures happiness on a numerical scale between 1 
and 9, where 1 represents happy and 9 represents unhappy. The second set measures 
arousal on a scale between 1 and 9, where 1 represents aroused and 9 represents 
unaroused. The third set measures dominance on a scale between 1 and 9, where 1 
represents dominated and 9 represents dominant. In all administrations involving SAM, 
the subjects were instructed to rate their personal satisfaction using the pictures 
provided. The SAM instructions included the list of words from the pertinent end of 
each semantic differential scale in order to identify the anchors of each dimension to the 
subject. Thus, the subjects were instructed, for example, to use the extreme happy SAM 
rating if their reaction was one of feeling “happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, hopeful, 
relaxed,” and to use the other extreme if they felt “unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, 
melancholic, despairing, or bored.” Similar instructions accompanied all three scales.9 
Given that the SAM questionnaire was administered immediately after providing 
subjects with feedback, we can be concerned that experimental demand effects drove 
any effect on individuals’ satisfaction. This means that subjects react to the feedback 
treatment because they think that the experimenter expects them to react. That is a 
pervasive concern without a clear solution in any study that elicits subjects’ satisfaction. 
We addressed this in two ways. First, instead of following a within-subject design, we 
followed a between-subject design, which is regarded as the safer methodology for 
avoiding demand effects. Second, we conducted our experiment under both piece-rate 
and flat-rate incentives and found radically different results depending on the incentives. 
These differences, which we discuss at length in Section 7, rule out the concern that the 
effects on satisfaction are due to pure demand effects.  
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 Eight sessions were provided with relative performance feedback, and the other eight sessions were 
provided with absolute performance feedback. We had control and treated sessions run on the same 
weekdays and at the same times for each incentive scheme. 
9
 The subjects were instructed to use the extreme aroused SAM rating if they felt “stimulated, excited, 
frenzied, jittery, wide awake, aroused” and to use the other extreme if they felt “relaxed, calm, sluggish, 
dull, sleepy, unaroused.” The subjects were instructed to use the extreme dominated SAM rating if they 
felt “controlled, influenced, cared for, awed, submissive” and to use the other extreme if they felt 
“controlling, influential, in control, important, dominant.”  
 9 
After the four working periods, the four periods of feedback and the SAM 
questions were completed, subjects were informed about their total earned money. The 
treatment group under piece-rate was also informed about the average earnings in the 
experiment, so that, again, they could observe whether they would get higher or lower 
pay than the average subject in the experimental session. The total average earnings in 
the experiment under piece-rate, including the show-up fee, were 14.10 euros, with the 
average being 13.45 euros in the control group and 14.74 euros in the treatment group. 
The earnings in the experiment under flat-rate, including the show-up fee, were 15 euros 
for both the control and treatment groups. We chose the 15-euros flat-rate as it was 
close to the average earnings under piece-rate.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework  
This section provides a framework for understanding the potential effects of 
feedback on both performance and emotional state under different incentive schemes. 
Our starting point, the null hypothesis, is that individuals should not respond to 
feedback since the underlying incentive schemes are held constant independent of this 
information. However, a number of alternative hypotheses can be considered.  
First, if we consider a standard selfish preferences set-up, agents may react to 
relative performance feedback because they have an imperfect knowledge of their own 
ability, and the feedback is informative of one’s ability. According to the self-perception 
ability hypothesis, where effort and ability are complements, agents who learn that they 
are performing above (below) the average would be encouraged (discouraged) when 
relative performance feedback is provided, compared to the situation in which this 
information is absent.10 Second, considering other-regarding-preferences, agents may 
have inherently competitive preferences, such that they get utility (disutility) from 
performing above (below) other agents. The provision of relative performance 
information allows agents to behave according to their competitiveness.11 Third, 
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 Ertac (2006) proposes a model in which ability and effort are complements in performance, predicting 
that individuals who learn that they are performing above (below) the average will exert more (less) effort 
than if they did not know. The psychology literature has also studied the role of self-assessment (see, for 
example, Sedikides, 1993).  
11
 Many models that incorporate competitiveness have been proposed. Kandel and Lazear (1992) propose 
a model where peer pressure enters additively into the utility function. A specific form of peer pressure 
mentioned by the authors is the difference between the average effort and one’s effort. Charness and 
Rabin (2002) propose a simple piece-wise linear utility in which others’ payoffs affect one’s utility. One 
type of interdependent preference their utility model includes is that of competitive preferences, where 
others’ payoffs enter negatively in one’s utility. Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004, 2005) and Moldovanu et 
al. (2005) assume that individuals have knowledge of the complete ranking, and they assume that 
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individuals may also interpret information about the average performance as the “norm” 
or the expected performance on a specific task, such that individuals want to comply 
with this norm and, thus, adjust their effort to meet the average performance.12  
The three alternative hypotheses outlined above predict different reactions 
regarding performance, which we can test empirically. The first, the self-perception of 
ability hypothesis, predicts that high- (low-) performing agents will be encouraged 
(discouraged) and, thus, increase (decrease) their effort. The second, the competitive 
preferences hypothesis, predicts an overall increase in performance, as these preferences 
foster competition in which individuals want to improve on their relative position, 
irrespective of their initial position in the performance distribution. Finally, the norm 
hypothesis predicts a mean reversion result on performance, such that low- (high-) 
performing agents increase (decrease) their performance.13  
 Regarding the effect on emotional response, and considering that utility 
represents individuals’ emotions (Lowenstein, 2000), these alternative hypotheses 
rationalize an emotional reaction to the provision of relative performance feedback. 
According to the competitive preferences hypothesis or the self-perception ability 
hypothesis, agents who learn that they are performing above (below) the average will 
have a positive (negative) emotional reaction—that is, they reveal themselves to be 
happier, more aroused and more dominating (unhappier, less aroused and more 
dominated) compared to the situation in which they do not receive this information. 
Therefore, the provision of relative performance feedback will increase the inequality in 
the emotional response between high- and low-performing agents, compared to the 
situation in which this information is not provided. According to the norm hypothesis, 
agents will have a negative emotional response to the information unless they meet the 
norm, such that irrespective of performing above or below the average, their emotional 
response, compared with the no-information setup, will be negative.  
Finally, we also compare responses under piece-rate and flat-rate incentive 
schemes. The different incentive schemes allow us to test for individuals’ underlying 
motivation—whether they respond to differences in performance and/or differences in 
income. Under piece-rate incentives, one cannot disentangle income from performance 
                                                                                                                                               
individuals get positive utility from the number of individuals below them and negative utility from the 
number of individuals above them. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) propose a utility in which “status” or 
position in the ranking enters multiplying the absolute income.  
12
 See Elster (1989) for a discussion on how social norms affect economic behavior. 
13
 For a more detailed discussion of theoretical predictions, see Azmat and Iriberri (2010), Section 3. 
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information, while under flat-rate incentives, one can identify that the effect is driven 
only by performance information.  

5.  Overview of the Results 
Table 1 presents the raw results for the effect of providing relative performance 
feedback. The main performance measure is Correct, which refers to the number of 
correct answers that subjects provide. We also look at the ratio of the number of correct 
answers to the number of submitted answers, which can be interpreted as the quality or 
effectiveness of performance, Quality. There are three aspects of satisfaction: subjective 
well-being (Happiness), feelings of arousal (Arousal), and feeling of dominance 
(Dominance).  For all variables, we report the mean values for the control and treatment 
groups under both piece-rate and flat-rate incentives. We test for treatment differences 
using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test and report the p-values in columns 4 and 6. 
The table shows that, under piece-rate, the feedback treatment has a positive 
effect on performance, where the effect is largest in the first period and then weakens 
over time. We do not find any effect of treatment on quality, with the exception of a 
positive effect in period 1. Looking by gender, we find that the (positive) performance 
differences are driven solely by male subjects. For all measures of affective response 
under piece-rate, we see that there is no significant effect of feedback. By gender, there 
are some notable differences in satisfaction: treated male subjects report being happier 
and more aroused than control male subjects, while treated female subjects report 
feeling less dominant than control female subjects. We also look at performance 
differences for other demographic differences (age, foreign, field of study and ability in 
math) between the control and treatment but, unlike gender, we do not find any 
significant differences.  
Under flat-rate incentives, we do not find an effect on performance or its quality; 
nor is there any effect on measures of satisfaction. Therefore, comparing piece-rate to 
flat-rate incentives, we find that feedback treatment on performance is significant only 
when performance is rewarded (i.e., under piece-rate). Again, by gender, there are some 
interesting differences. Feedback treatment has a (small) positive effect on the 
performance of male subjects but a negative effect on the performance of female 
subjects. Treated female subjects are less aroused than control female subjects, and 
treated male subjects feel less dominant than control male subjects. As with piece-rate 
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performance, we do not see performance differences for other demographic 
characteristics.14 
Figures 3 to 6 show the cumulative distribution functions for the treatment and 
control groups under piece-rate and under flat-rate incentives, confirming the previous 
results. Under piece-rate, the distributions in Figure 3 clearly show that the treated 
subjects outperform the control subjects. This difference is shown in all parts of the 
distribution, suggesting that the treatment had a positive effect on the treated subjects, 
independent of the information they were receiving—that is, whether they were 
performing above or below the average. Figure 4 further shows that the overall positive 
effect comes only from male subjects, while female subjects show no reaction. Under 
flat-rate, the distributions in Figure 4 show that the treated subjects do not behave 
differently from the control subjects. However, when separated by gender, as shown in 
Figure 6, men react positively to the information, while women react negatively.  
In addition to the main results, it is important to mention the difference in the 
baseline performance under the two incentive schemes. We find that the control groups 
under piece-rate and flat-rate incentives perform similarly (p-value 0.4001). Although 
economic theory would suggest that agents would not exert effort when pay is 
independent of performance, empirical evidence from the lab suggests otherwise.15  
A number of arguments for why individuals perform the work in the lab despite 
a flat-rate incentive scheme, have been put forward. First, as in our setting, there are no 
alternatives to doing the task, such as allowing subjects to surf the web or read 
magazines. Subjects may simply perform the task as a way to overcome “boredom.” 
Charness et al. (forthcoming), however, offer an alternative in a flat-rate setting but still 
find positive performance. Second, subjects may feel morally obliged to work, given 
that they will receive payment. This could be the underlying motivation for putting in 
the effort, despite having alternative tasks. Finally, the amount paid and the effort 
exerted under flat-rate might reflect the subjects’ reservation “wage.” In our setting, the 
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 In the regression analysis in the next section, we test for differential treatment effects that depend on 
demographics, both under piece-rate and flat-rate incentive schemes. As in the raw analysis, other than 
gender, we do not find robust differential treatment effect. We only report the gender differentials in 
treatment. Other tables are available on request. 
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 For example, Khunen and Tymula (2012) paid their subjects a flat-rate of 23 dollars and find that 
agents solved, on average, 10.58 multiplication problems in 90 seconds in the control treatment (no 
feedback). In another example, Charness et al. (forthcoming) paid a flat-rate of one euro per two minute 
period in which subjects could decode sets of one-digit numbers into letters from a grid of letters that is 
displayed on the computer screen. Subjects solved, on average, 23.54 decoding problems in the control 
group (no feedback). 
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flat-rate of 15 euros was set to match the average payment under piece-rate (14.10 
euros). Offering a similar average payment under the two incentive schemes might 
explain the similarity in baseline performance. 
 
6. Regression Analysis under Piece-Rate Incentives 
This section consists of two main parts. First, we focus on the effect of relative 
performance feedback on individual performance. Second, we study the effect on 
satisfaction. For both performance and satisfaction, we start by measuring the overall 
effect of the feedback. We then look for gender differences and, finally, analyze the 
effect of the feedback content on each of the outcomes. 
 
6.1. The Effect of Relative Performance Feedback on Performance 
6.1.1. The Overall Effect 
We estimate the following linear regression to quantify the average treatment 
effect on performance. 
(1)     	

  
	    ,
where the dependent variable, itY , refers to the performance measures, Correct and 
Quality, for individual i at period t. The variable Treatment identifies those who receive 
the relative performance feedback. We also include a time trend, Period. Finally, iX is a 
vector of control variables, including gender, foreign, age and controls for ability. One 
concern may be that the treated group is of different ability than the control group. 
Although this is highly unlikely given the random allocation between treatment and 
control groups, we rule out this concern by using different measures of ability. First, we 
include a dummy for whether or not subjects’ area of study was science-oriented 
(Science).16 Second, we include a dummy variable for whether the subject took the math 
test in the national-level university entry exam Selectividad (Math_Test).17 
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 We classify a degree to be a Science degree if Mathematics plays an important role in that program. See 
the classification in the Notes of Table 2. 
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 Selectividad is similar to the Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) used in the United States, taken at the 
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topics covered during the last year of high school. If the student wants to do a science-oriented degree, 
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same estimates. We also have information on subjects’ grade in the math test. When we include the grade 
or grade distribution, the results do not change.  
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Columns 1 and 6 in Table 2 show the estimates for equation (1) for the correct 
summations and quality of performance, respectively. Since there are four working 
periods for each subject, we also weight the observations by the individual fixed effects 
(random-effects model). The treated subjects correctly answer 17 percent (treatment 
coefficient 2.06) more summations than the control subjects. Clearly, subjects increased 
their performance due to the feedback. However, the quality of performance does not 
change. This is due to the increase in the two variables—the number of submitted and 
correct answers—being very similar.  
Time also matters, so we further investigate the treatment effect separately for 
each period. In columns 2-5 and 7-10 of Table 2, we estimate, by OLS, equation (1) for 
periods 1 to 4 for correct summations and quality of summations, respectively. 
Regarding the correct number of summations, over time, subjects improve in their 
performance, which implies that there is learning. Both control and treated subjects 
become accustomed to the computer application and the task.18 We can also see that this 
learning is steeper in the beginning and slows down in the last period for both control 
and treated subjects. More interestingly, treated subjects outperform the control subjects 
in each period. The effect is strongest in the initial period, suggesting an anticipation 
effect.19 The anticipation effect is also in line with those found by Blanes i Vidal and 
Nossol (2011) and Kuhnen and Tymula (2012). The quality of performance is 
significantly larger only in the first period, and, afterwards, the control and treated 
subjects do not differ in the quality of their performance. The coefficients in periods 2, 3 
and 4 are not significantly different from one another.20  
In summary, the provision of relative performance feedback has a positive and 
significant effect on subjects’ performance. Since the learning over time is the same for 
both treatment and control groups, and since we have also controlled for ability, neither 
of these components can explain the results. Therefore, feedback treatment explains the 
increase in performance.  
                                                 
18
 Subjects were not allowed to use paper and pencil for summations. We observed that many subjects 
started doing the summations row by row instead of column by column. Many subjects quickly realized 
that doing the summations column by column and writing the answers by column was faster than 
otherwise, improving their performance substantially. We explore whether there is heterogeneity in 
learning for different demographic groups. We do not find any significant effect. 
19
 We observed the strong first-period effect in all four sessions for the treated subjects.  
20
 When we combine all periods and compare the treatment effect for each period pair-wise, we find that 
they are not significantly different. For Correct, the p-values for periods 2 and 3, periods 2 and 4, and 
periods 3 and 4 are 0.949, 0.814 and 0.863, respectively. For Quality, the p-values for periods 2 and 3, 
periods 2 and 4, and periods 3 and 4 are 0.794, 0.791 and 0.996, respectively.    
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6.1.2. Gender Analysis 
 Many studies have shown gender to be an important variable when looking at 
behavior (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009). We investigate whether men and women react 
differently to the provision of feedback. We estimate the following equation: 
(2)     
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where our variable of interest is the interaction between women and the treatment. The 
results are shown in Table 3: we find very strong gender effects. Note that we always 
control for demographics (Foreign, Age, Science, Math_Test) such that the strong 
gender differential is not being driven by differences between men and women in those 
characteristics. Treated women do not react differently from non-treated women, while 
treated men do react positively compared to non-treated men. Notice that from our 
estimates in column 1, on average, male subjects receiving feedback increase their 
performance by 5.62 relative to males in the control group, while treated females do not 
increase their performance. These results are striking since they imply that all of the 
observed effect on performance is attributed solely to men. While treated men increase 
their performance by 56 percent, treated women’s performance does not change at all. 
We also find that there is a gender difference in the quality of the performance, such 
that treated male subjects make fewer mistakes compared with untreated male subjects, 
and there is no effect for female subjects. However, this gender difference in the quality 
of performance is significant only in period 1 and disappears.   
 
6.1.3. Feedback Content 
We now consider the importance of the content of the feedback. From periods 2 
to 4, subjects can react not only to the provision of feedback, but also to the 
informational content in the previous periods. In other words, if a subject learns in one 
period that she is performing above (below) the average, that feedback might influence 
her performance in the subsequent period.  
We distinguish between positive and negative feedback. From periods 2 to 4, 
positive (negative) feedback would imply that a subject performed above (below) the 
average in the previous period. We also look at the accumulation of feedback 
information. In periods 3 and 4, positive (negative) feedback would be a situation in 
which the subject either performed above (below) the average in the previous two 
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periods, or in which she has improved (worsened)—i.e., she was initially below (above) 
the average and is now performing above (below). Finally, in period 4, positive 
(negative) feedback would be a situation in which the subject has performed above 
(below) the average in the previous three periods, or in which she has improved 
(worsened).21 Note that for the treated subjects, this information is revealed—i.e., it 
becomes feedback—while for the control subjects it is not. For example, a control 
subject who has performed above the average will not be informed that she is 
performing above average. For simplicity, we refer to being above average as positive 
feedback, regardless of whether or not this information has been revealed.22 
We estimate the following regression:  
(3)     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where ( 1)tPositive −  is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the subject performed 
above the average, or improved over time (as explained above), and 0 otherwise. itY
measures performance and quality of performance.  
Panel A in Table 4 shows the estimates for equation (3) for the different periods. 
In column 1, consistent with our previous analysis, treated subjects outperform 
untreated subjects. In addition, subjects’ performance is correlated from period to 
period, as shown in the coefficient Positive. Interestingly, the interaction between the 
treatment and Positive is not significant. This suggests that the feedback content is 
irrelevant for subsequent performances. In other words, what matters is the provision of 
feedback, and regardless of whether the feedback is positive or negative, performance 
will increase. Estimations for the different levels of cumulative feedback, in columns 2 
and 3, imply similar results. The results are, however, somehow weaker given the 
limited number of observations as we approach the final period. With regard to the 
quality of performance, shown in columns 4 to 6, high-performing subjects have a 
higher quality of performance. In addition, consistent with previous findings, there is no 
                                                 
21
 Improving includes the following two cases: (1) below the average in period 1, above the average in 
periods 2 and 3; and (2) below the average in periods 1 and 2, above the average in period 3. The reverse 
is true for worsening. 
22
 There are other ways of specifying positive and negative feedback. For example, one could use the 
within individual improvement (decline) over time, with respect to the average. In other words, although 
an individual may be consistently performing below the average (i.e., negative feedback in our 
specification), if, over time, she is getting closer to the average, then this may be perceived as positive 
feedback. We replicate our analysis using this specification, and the results are in line with those found 
using our specification. 
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significant treatment effect or differential treatment effect that depended on the content 
of the feedback.  
Given the important gender differences we found in the previous section, it is 
interesting to understand whether men and women also react differently to the content 
of the feedback. Panel B shows the estimates for equation (3) for men only, while Panel 
C shows the estimates for women only.   
From Panel B, we see that men react to the informational treatment, no matter 
whether they receive positive or negative feedback. This is consistent with the overall 
result. In Panel C, when we look at women, we find that the treatment, as well as the 
interaction of the content with treatment, is not significant. This is consistent with our 
previous finding that women do not react to either the informational treatment or the 
content of the feedback. Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 give the estimates for the cumulative 
information. For men, the estimates suggest the same findings, but they become less 
significant due to fewer observations. Interestingly, for women, although not 
significant, there are some differential effects depending on the content of the 
information. The negative interaction term suggests that the response to positive 
feedback is smaller than the response to negative feedback.  
We extend our analysis using a continuous measure of feedback content. Instead 
of positive (negative) feedback, we use the difference between one’s performance, 
measured by Correct, and the average performance. We proceed in the same way and 
define the interaction between the treatment and the difference between one’s 
performance and the average performance. We find qualitatively the same results—that 
is, the interaction between this difference and the treatment is insignificant.23  
 
Overall, in this section, we find three important results. First, the provision of 
relative performance feedback has a positive and significant effect on subjects’ 
performance. In each period, the treated subjects outperform the untreated, although the 
effect gets weaker over time. Second, the actual content of the feedback (positive or 
negative) does not affect subjects’ subsequent performance differently. This is 
consistent with the competitive preferences hypothesis, but not with the other two 
alternative hypotheses we considered, as they predicted different reactions depending on 
                                                 
23
 These results are available upon request.  
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whether the feedback was positive or negative. Third, we find a strong gender 
difference in the reaction to the treatment, with the overall effect driven solely by men. 
 
6.2. Satisfaction: Happiness, Arousal and Dominance 
6.2.1. The Overall Effect 
Relative performance feedback potentially affects aspects other than 
performance. In particular, it may influence a subject’s satisfaction. Organizations care 
about the affective state of their employees since it has been found that this affects 
relevant issues, such as workers’ morale, firms’ retention ability (Bewley, 1999), and 
even productivity (see, for example, Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985; Warr, 1999; and 
Oswald et al., 2009). We measure three aspects of satisfaction: feelings of happiness (or 
subjective well-being), arousal and dominance.   
We start by looking at the overall treatment effect on these measures. Equation 
(1) of section 6.1 is estimated, with the dependent variable itY  now referring to 
happiness, arousal and dominance, respectively. The control variables, iX , are the same 
as before. We also include an additional control that measures the number of correct 
summations, Correct.24 It is reasonable to assume that performance and satisfaction 
measures are positively correlated (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Table 5 shows the 
results for the three variables of interest. The first column of each panel refers to the 
overall effect, controlling for time-fixed effects and weighting the observations by the 
individual fixed effects (random-effects model). The other four columns refer to periods 
1 to 4, respectively.  
The main result is that treatment is insignificant for all measures of satisfaction, 
implying that the provision of relative performance feedback does not affect the 
subjects’ well-being, arousal and/or feeling of dominance. As expected, the number of 
correct summations is positively correlated with all three satisfaction measures. As for 
the other control variables, the only noteworthy finding is that, as one would expect, 
subjects find the task less interesting over time (arousal level decreases).  
 
6.2.2. Gender 
                                                 
24
 We also estimate (1) without the variable Correct, and the main results remain the same.  
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In Section 6.1.2, we found that the provision of relative performance feedback 
affected men’s performance very differently from women’s. It is, therefore, natural to 
investigate whether there are gender differences in satisfaction.  
We extend the analysis from the previous section, in line with equation (2), to 
look for gender differences in the treatment effect. Table 6 shows that the treatment is 
insignificant. Additionally, the interaction coefficient of female and the treatment 
implies that the provision of relative performance feedback does not affect men’s 
satisfaction differently from women’s.  
 
6.2.3. Feedback Content 
 As with performance, we now study the effect of the informational content on 
the subjects’ satisfaction. We will estimate the following equation:  
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where itY refers to the satisfaction measures and itPositive is a dummy variable if the 
subject performed above the average or improved over time (as explained in section 
6.1.3), and 0 otherwise. Note that unlike equation (3), the feedback content in the 
current period will affect the dependent variable in the same period (see the timeline of 
the experiment in Figure 1). This information is provided to the treated subjects just 
before eliciting their satisfaction. As with the performance analysis, we also consider 
how the cumulative feedback affects individual satisfaction. 
Table 7 shows the estimation for the differential effects of the content of the 
feedback on satisfaction. In the first panel, columns 1 to 4, we consider the effect of the 
feedback content on happiness. As we saw in the previous estimates, people who are 
performing well—in this case, those who are performing above the average—reveal 
themselves to be significantly happier. More importantly, the treatment significantly 
increases the inequality between the happiness of subjects who are receiving positive 
feedback and those who are receiving negative feedback. We find that a treated subject 
who is performing below the average reports a lower level (-0.31) of happiness 
compared to an untreated subject performing below the average, whereas a treated 
subject who is performing above the average reports a higher level (0.49) of happiness 
compared to an untreated subject who is also performing above the average. This 
implies that control subjects performing above the average are seven-percent happier 
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than those performing below the average. Among treated subjects, those who are given 
positive feedback reveal themselves to be 15-percent happier than those who are given 
negative feedback. Overall, the informational feedback treatment leads to an increase in 
the inequality of subjects’ happiness by eight percentage points.  
This result is a key finding, and one that is not obvious when we only look at the 
average effect of the treatment on happiness, as the positive effect on those above 
average and the negative effect on those below the average are cancelled out. However, 
once we control for the content of the information, the treatment increases the difference 
in happiness between those who received positive and those who received negative 
feedback.  
When we look at the cumulative effect of feedback, in columns 2 to 4, we see 
very similar results. The magnitude of the gap between the subjects performing above 
and below the average is increasing over time. In the final period, we find that in the 
control group, the gap in happiness between the above- and below-average performing 
subjects remains stable (from seven to 11 percent) for the treatment group, while the 
gap increases substantially with the cumulative feedback (from 15 to 21 percent). 
Columns 5 to 8 show the results for arousal. Overall, we find no significant 
effect of the interaction between the content and the treatment. What we do see is that 
the subjects performing above the average, irrespective of the treatment, reveal 
themselves to be more aroused than those performing below the average. Also, over 
time, as expected, subjects’ arousal goes down. 
Columns 9 to 12 show the results for the feeling of dominance. Overall, we find 
a significant effect of the interaction between the content and the treatment. Providing 
subjects with positive feedback increases the gap in the feeling of dominance between 
those subjects performing above and those performing below the average. This implies 
that control subjects performing above the average feel four-percent more dominant 
than those performing below the average. For the treated subjects, however, those who 
receive positive feedback reveal themselves to feel 12-percent more dominant than 
those who receive negative feedback. Thus, the feedback treatment leads to an increase 
in the gap of subjects’ dominance by eight percentage points. More importantly, when 
we look at the cumulative effects, we also find some interesting results. From columns 
10-12, we see that consistently receiving positive (negative) feedback has a significantly 
positive (negative) effect on the treated subjects’ feeling of dominance. In particular, in 
period 4, the feedback treatment leads to an increase in the gap of subjects’ dominance 
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by 24 percentage points. We find that while, for the control group, the gap in dominance 
between the above- and below-average performing subjects remains stable (at four 
percent), for the treatment group, the gap increases substantially with the cumulative 
feedback (from 12 to 28 percent). 
As in section 6.1.3, we also extended our analysis using a continuous measure of 
feedback content. Instead of positive (negative) feedback, we use the difference 
between one’s performance and the average performance. We proceed in the same way 
and define the interaction between the treatment and the difference between one’s 
performance and the average performance. We find qualitatively the same results—that 
is, the interaction between this difference and the treatment is positive and significant.25 
We also check for gender differences in the reaction to the feedback content and 
find no significant differences between men and women. This is in line with the results 
found in section 6.2.2. 
 This section shows that the treatment has very different effects on the 
satisfaction of those receiving positive versus negative feedback. We find that receiving 
positive (negative) feedback affects subjects’ happiness and dominance levels positively 
(negatively), such that when we consider only the overall treatment effect, the opposite 
signs cancel out. This also suggests that the increase in happiness (dominance) for those 
subjects performing above average and the decrease in happiness (dominance) for those 
performing below average is of equal magnitude. Furthermore, the treatment increases 
the inequality in both the happiness and dominance levels. The increase in inequality is 
consistent with both self-perception of ability and the competitive preferences 
hypotheses. Given that we find a positive effect of performance feedback independent 
of its content, we conclude that the results are consistent with the competitive 
preferences framework.  
Since we elicit subjects’ satisfaction after the feedback treatment, we are 
concerned that there may be experimental demand effects. We are able to rule this out in 
the following section.  
 
7.  Analysis under Flat-Rate Incentives 
We now study the effect of providing relative performance feedback under an 
incentive scheme that is independent of performance (i.e., flat-rate incentives). Under 
                                                 
25
 These results are available upon request.  
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piece-rate incentives, since agents are rewarded according to their absolute 
performance, the feedback informs them about both their relative performance and their 
relative income. It is important to understand whether individuals are reacting to either 
the relative performance or to the relative income, or to both. A good way to separate 
the two effects is by changing the underlying incentive scheme from piece-rate to flat-
rate. Since, under piece-rate, what we observe is the net effect, the analysis under flat-
rate allows us to disentangle the performance effect from the income effect.  
We find no effect of providing relative performance feedback on either of the 
two measures of performance in the regression analysis in Table 8, confirming what we 
already observed in Table 1 and Figure 5. We have also analyzed pooling the two data 
sets and looked at the differential treatment effect under piece-rate and flat-rate 
incentives. We find that the interaction between the treatment and the incentive scheme 
is significantly different from zero. 
There is, however, an interesting gender difference, as observed under piece-rate 
incentives. From Table 9, we can see that men react positively to the treatment, 
although the magnitudes are much smaller than under piece-rate incentives (19 percent 
versus 56 percent). Furthermore, we find that the interaction between treatment and 
females is negative (-13 percent) and significant, such that women react negatively to 
the relative performance information. Consistent with previous results, we do not find a 
strong effect on the quality of performance. The observed effects under piece-rate 
incentives measure the net effect of providing both relative income and relative 
performance feedback, while the observed effect under flat-rate incentives measures 
only the effect of providing relative performance feedback. From this comparison, we 
can conclude that, while both men and women react positively to relative income 
information, women and men react oppositely to the purely relative performance 
information.  
Regarding satisfaction, we find that relative performance feedback has no effect 
on the three variables of interest. Contrary to what we found under piece-rate incentives, 
even when we control for the feedback content (learning that one is performing above or 
below the average), as shown in Table 10, we find that treatment is not significant.26  
The results suggests that the effects on both happiness and the feeling of 
dominance are a real response to relevant information and not driven by an 
                                                 
26
 As under piece-rate, we also check for gender differences in the reaction to the feedback content and do 
not find significant differences between men and women. 
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experimental demand effect. This is reassuring, as it strengthens the validity of our 
findings under piece-rate. We refer to it as relevant information because relative 
performance feedback under piece-rate has consequences in terms of relative income, 
while under flat-rate incentives it does not. These differences in the responses help us to 
also rule out that the effects on satisfaction found under piece-rate incentives are due to 
purely experimental demand effects.  
We conclude that the provision of relative performance feedback is most 
effective under piece-rate incentives, as it pushes subjects to work harder and increase 
their productivity. Moreover, it has important effects for the subjects’ satisfaction, 
increasing the inequality in happiness and the feeling of dominance between subjects 
who perform above and those who perform below the average, only under piece-rate 
incentives. In other words, when this information has consequences in terms of relative 
income, subjects react by being happier (unhappier) if they are above (below) the 
average because this translates into more (less) earnings than the average. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
In this study, we have shown that relative performance feedback under piece-
rate incentives is an important tool in increasing individuals’ performance, independent 
of the feedback content. Given that the provision of this feedback is easy to implement 
and almost cost-free, it is an attractive policy to improve performance. However, 
individuals react only when relative performance information has consequences in terms 
of relative income (i.e., under piece-rate but not under flat-rate incentives). This implies 
that the incentive scheme under which the information is provided matters. 
As further evidence of when the information matters, we investigate when 
individuals care about information via their levels of satisfaction. We show that relative 
performance feedback increases the inequality in individuals’ happiness and feeling of 
dominance. Although enhancing performance is a positive result, the increased 
inequality in satisfaction might imply a possible trade-off to a principal or policy maker 
who is deciding whether or not to provide relative performance feedback. However, 
even if an organization places more weight on individual satisfaction than on 
performance per se, it is not entirely clear that it would not use relative performance 
feedback. For example, firms that care about the well-being of their workers may also 
choose to provide feedback since, by doing so, they may accelerate the match quality of 
their workers.  
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The findings in terms of performance and emotional response are consistent with 
a framework in which individuals behaviorally respond to the information on their 
relative position regarding income. In particular, individuals get extra-utility (disutility) 
if they are earning above (below) the average, such that this information fosters 
competition in which individuals want to improve on their relative position. 
We also find a strong gender difference in the reaction to the treatment. In 
particular, we show that gender differences in performance are important when relative 
performance feedback is provided. Given that the provision of the feedback facilitates 
social comparison and that we observed that the increase in performance is consistent 
with the competitive preferences hypothesis, this finding can be related to the recent 
literature on gender differences in competitive environments (see Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011).27 We show that the provision of relative 
performance feedback—which can promote competition among individuals but where 
competition is rather symbolic—is enough to create gender differences in performance. 
The results of this paper open new research questions. For example, long-term 
effects of relative performance feedback need to be studied further—in particular, using 
field studies. Another important area of study is other behavioral responses to feedback, 
such as the option of quitting or taking actions that go against organizations’ interests. 
Finally, further investigation into what drives the gender difference would be an 
important next step. 
 
  
                                                 
27
 Women are found to shy away from competition, showing a preference for non-competitive 
environments (Deaner, 2006a and 2006b; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; and Niederle and Yestrumskas, 
2008), although this is reversed when we switch to matrilineal societies (Gneezy et al., 2007). Also, 
women tend to underperform in competitive environments compared to men, mostly because men’s 
performance increases when competing against women (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2004; Antonovics et al., 2009; and Hogarth et al., 2009). 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Timeline of the Experiment 
 
Figure 2. Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)  
Panel A: Happiness 
 
             1    2       3         4             5           6             7            8            9 
Note: 1 represents feeling “happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, hopeful, relaxed,” and 9 represents 
feeling “unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melancholic, despairing, or bored.” 
 
Panel B: Arousal 
 
             1    2       3         4             5           6             7             8           9 
Note: 1 represents feeling “stimulated, excited, frenzied, jittery, wide awake, aroused,” and 9 represents 
feeling “relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull, sleepy, unaroused.” 
 
Panel C: Dominance 
             
             1    2       3         4             5           6             7           8            9 
Note: 1 represents feeling “controlled, influenced, cared for, awed, submissive,” and 9 represents feeling 
“controlling, influential, in control, important, dominant.” 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution under Piece-Rate 
 
Notes: The p-value for the for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, comparing the distributions of the treated 
and control subjects, is given by 0.001. 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative Distributions under Piece-Rate by Gender 
  
Notes: The p-value for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, comparing the distribution of the treated and 
control subjects, is given by 0.000 and 0.981 for male and female subjects, respectively.  
 
Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution under Flat-Rate 
 
Notes: The p-value for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, comparing the distributions of the treated and 
control subjects, is given by 0.238.  
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Figure 6: Cumulative Distributions under Flat-Rate by Gender 
   
Notes: The p-value for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, comparing the distribution of the treated and 
control subjects, is given by 0.012 and 0.003 for male and female subjects, respectively.  
 
 
 
  
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 10 20 30 40
No. of Summations
Control Treatment
CDF of Correct No. of Summations (MALE)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 10 20 30 40
No. of Summations
Control Treatment
CDF of Correct No. of Summations (FEMALE)
 32 
Table 1: Raw Results by Treatment 
 Piece-Rate Incentives Flat-Rate Incentives 
 Control Treatment p-value Control Treatment p-value 
Correct       
Overall 17.43 19.57 0.00 17.65 17.32 0.42 
Period 1 13.39 16.51 0.00 14.15 13.60 0.41 
Period 2 16.86 18.81 0.06 17.01 17.47 0.67 
Period 3 19.38 21.24 0.08 19.37 18.54 0.38 
Period 4 20.10 21.73 0.07 20.06 19.65 0.61 
Male 15.12 21.03 0.00 17.44 19.77 0.01 
Female 18.61 18.55 0.92 17.81 15.70 0.00 
Quality       
Overall 0.85 0.87 0.14 0.87 0.85 0.22 
Period 1 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.84 0.84 0.72 
Period 2 0.86 0.87 0.54 0.87 0.85 0.98 
Period 3 0.87 0.87 0.66 0.89 0.84 0.06 
Period 4 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.87 0.86 0.84 
Male 0.81 0.88 0.00 0.85 0.86 0.69 
Female 0.87 0.86 0.40 0.88 0.84 0.04 
Happiness       
Overall 6.66 6.60 0.86 6.71 6.65 0.87 
Period 1 6.36 6.44 0.50 6.72 6.82 0.30 
Period 2 6.63 6.48 0.76 6.55 6.71 0.60 
Period 3 6.74 6.53 0.69 6.83 6.45 0.14 
Period 4 6.93 6.95 0.68 6.76 6.64 0.82 
Male 6.32 6.65 0.04 6.38 6.67 0.42 
Female 6.83 6.56 0.17 6.96 6.64 0.42 
Arousal       
Overall 4.86 5.07 0.10 4.81 4.55 0.08 
Period 1 4.86 5.10 0.35 4.73 4.56 0.56 
Period 2 5.14 5.20 0.92 4.91 4.63 0.33 
Period 3 5.01 5.19 0.46 4.87 4.59 0.36 
Period 4 4.41 4.80 0.18 4.75 4.40 0.29 
Male 4.46 5.11 0.07 4.95 4.97 0.84 
Female 5.00 5.05 0.43 4.72 4.27 0.01 
Dominance       
Overall 6.32 6.28 0.34 6.41 6.10 0.02 
Period 1 6.10 6.20 0.71 6.50 6.14 0.22 
Period 2 6.36 6.21 0.25 6.32 6.21 0.63 
Period 3 6.41 6.28 0.56 6.42 5.86 0.04 
Period 4 6.40 6.44 0.91 6.39 6.19 0.38 
Male 6.22 6.55 0.33 6.89 6.23 0.00 
Female 6.37 6.10 0.03 6.05 6.02 0.90 
 Notes: The columns Control and Treatment provide the average performance (Correct), quality of 
performance (Quality), and emotional response (Happiness, Arousal, Dominance) for each group, 
respectively. The p-values refer to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which tests for the difference between the 
groups. 
Table 2: Treatment Effect on Performance under Piece-Rate: Correct and Quality 
 Correct Quality 
 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 12.0878** 11.9685** 16.7831*** 22.6080*** 17.3480*** 0.8426*** 0.8797*** 0.8728*** 0.9203*** 0.8425*** 
 [4.823] [5.678] [5.138] [4.934] [5.351] [0.084] [0.205] [0.113] [0.100] [0.093] 
Treatment 2.0601** 3.0739*** 1.8354* 1.7255* 1.6058 0.0198 0.0627** 0.009 0.0016 0.0059 
 [0.902] [1.005] [0.984] [0.984] [1.008] [0.016] [0.026] [0.023] [0.019] [0.016] 
Period 2.0356***     0.0145***     
 [0.122]     [0.004]     
Female 0.4984 0.7143 1.0646 0.3408 -0.1262 0.0208 0.0516* 0.0149 0.0235 -0.0067 
 [0.982] [1.052] [1.059] [1.109] [1.075] [0.016] [0.030] [0.022] [0.021] [0.018] 
Foreign 0.561 0.4755 1.6187 0.4245 -0.2745 0.0336 0.0478 0.0641* 0.016 0.0066 
 [2.024] [2.358] [2.049] [2.024] [2.538] [0.031] [0.072] [0.038] [0.044] [0.035] 
Age -0.0737 -0.0365 -0.1228 -0.2229 0.0876 -0.0027 -0.0072 -0.0021 -0.0033 0.0016 
 [0.220] [0.265] [0.231] [0.215] [0.242] [0.004] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
Science 0.2636 0.104 0.4042 0.4266 0.1197 0.002 0.0042 -0.0003 0.0252 -0.0209 
 [0.970] [1.029] [1.001] [1.100] [1.114] [0.016] [0.024] [0.021] [0.022] [0.018] 
Math_Test 1.8610* 2.2950* 2.3779** 1.4743 1.2969 0.0115 0.0307 0.0218 -0.0094 0.0031 
 [1.054] [1.252] [1.158] [1.181] [1.164] [0.018] [0.035] [0.028] [0.022] [0.020] 
Math_Test_Missing -3.1609 -4.0274 -4.2998* -2.6649 -1.6517 0.0251 0.0361 -0.0121 0.0457 0.0306 
 [2.116] [2.488] [2.318] [2.424] [2.461] [0.030] [0.067] [0.045] [0.041] [0.037] 
Observations 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 
Number of subject 160     160     
R-squared  0.088 0.061 0.049 0.025  0.084 0.022 0.026 0.022 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. The variable Science takes value 1 if the degree is in Architecture, Biology, Business, Computer Science, Economics, Engineering or Human 
Resources and 0 if the degree is in Communication, Health, Human Science, Law, Marketing, Photography, Political Science and Translation and Interpretation. The variable 
Math_Test takes value 1 if the subject took the Math test in the national-level university entry exam “Selectividad.” Math_Test_Missing takes value 1 if the subject does not 
report whether he or she took the Math test in Selectividad (note that there are only eight subjects for whom this information is missing).  
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Table 3: Gender Differences in the Treatment Effect on Performance under Piece-Rate 
  Correct Quality  
  ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 9.9488** 9.3437* 14.5116*** 20.8086*** 15.4876*** 0.8103*** 0.8104*** 0.8534*** 0.9025*** 0.8195*** 
  [4.450] [5.190] [4.912] [4.632] [5.122] [0.079] [0.192] [0.121] [0.098] [0.088] 
Treatment 5.6179*** 7.4395*** 5.6135*** 4.7184*** 4.7001*** 0.0736*** 0.1781*** 0.0413 0.0311 0.0441 
  [1.511] [1.609] [1.720] [1.747] [1.591] [0.027] [0.052] [0.041] [0.035] [0.029] 
Female 3.4430*** 4.3276*** 4.1916*** 2.8178** 2.4348* 0.0654*** 0.1470*** 0.0415 0.048 0.0249 
  [1.180] [1.269] [1.326] [1.380] [1.395] [0.025] [0.050] [0.036] [0.032] [0.027] 
FemalexTreatment -5.6691*** -6.9564*** -6.0201*** -4.7690** -4.9307** -0.0858*** -0.1838*** -0.0513 -0.0471 -0.0609* 
  [1.811] [1.967] [2.024] [2.046] [1.990] [0.031] [0.058] [0.047] [0.040] [0.035] 
Period 2.0356***     0.0145***     
 [0.123]     [0.004]     
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 
Number of subject 160     160     
R-squared  0.156 0.115 0.083 0.061  0.153 0.031 0.036 0.043 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. For a description of “Control Variables,” see notes of Table 2. 
Table 4: Feedback Content on the Treatment Effect on Performance under Piece-Rate 
PANEL A Correct Quality 
  PERIODS 2-4 PERIODS 3-4 PERIOD 4 PERIODS 2-4 PERIODS 3-4 PERIOD 4 
Constant 10.4632*** 13.5234*** 10.4381*** 0.8193*** 0.8286*** 0.7502*** 
  [2.717] [2.887] [3.552] [0.066] [0.080] [0.070] 
Treatment 1.6195** 1.3172* 1.4808 0.0084 0.0022 0.0152 
  [0.649] [0.681] [1.185] [0.027] [0.029] [0.023] 
Positive 8.7330*** 9.1939*** 9.6846*** 0.1115*** 0.1177*** 0.1323*** 
  [0.703] [0.716] [1.040] [0.020] [0.022] [0.021] 
PositivexTreatment 1.0141 0.9917 0.5545 0.006 0.0079 -0.0091 
  [1.057] [1.055] [1.452] [0.028] [0.030] [0.029] 
Period 1.0387*** -0.1205 
  
-0.0029 -0.0099 
  
  [0.164] [0.290] 
  
[0.005] [0.007] 
  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 480 320 160 480 320 160 
PANEL B Correct (MALE) Quality (MALE) 
Constant 11.3854*** 11.5650*** 8.0997 0.7835*** 0.7170*** 0.6607*** 
  [3.986] [4.288] [5.794] [0.121] [0.135] [0.124] 
Treatment 1.9125* 1.286 1.3685 0.0268 0.0341 0.0364 
  [1.134] [1.326] [2.053] [0.043] [0.052] [0.044] 
Positive 8.2538*** 8.7481*** 8.7700*** 0.1213*** 0.1618*** 0.1534*** 
  [1.251] [1.300] [1.752] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038] 
PositivexTreatment 2.9366 2.9605 2.5089 -0.0037 -0.0316 -0.0269 
  [1.948] [1.928] [2.459] [0.048] [0.052] [0.053] 
Period 0.8257** -0.0104   -0.0047 0.0018   
  [0.320] [0.469]   [0.009] [0.013]   
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 180 120 60 180 120 60 
PANEL C Correct (FEMALE) Quality (FEMALE) 
Constant 9.4470*** 14.7880*** 12.3310*** 0.8510*** 0.8858*** 0.7825*** 
  [3.295] [3.492] [4.599] [0.081] [0.094] [0.087] 
Treatment 1.3092* 1.2006 1.5777 -0.0029 -0.022 -0.0025 
  [0.753] [0.758] [1.518] [0.035] [0.034] [0.029] 
Positive 8.4789*** 9.1797*** 10.0729*** 0.1004*** 0.0890*** 0.1190*** 
  [0.808] [0.850] [1.366] [0.026] [0.028] [0.026] 
PositivexTreatment 0.0161 -0.1558 -0.709 0.0121 0.0327 0.0035 
  [1.260] [1.313] [1.861] [0.036] [0.036] [0.035] 
Period 1.1700*** -0.1879   -0.0021 -0.0167*   
  [0.192] [0.366]   [0.006] [0.009]   
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 300 200 100 300 200 100 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session and subject level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at 
the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The 
variable Positive refers to being above average or improving performance. For a description of “Control 
Variables,” see notes of Table 2. 
 Table 5: Treatment Effect on Satisfaction under Piece-Rate: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance  
  HAPPINESS AROUSAL DOMINANCE 
  
ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 5.5302*** 6.3570*** 5.6147*** 5.3794*** 5.2132*** 8.7344*** 10.5267*** 8.6353*** 8.7126*** 9.5628*** 5.5028*** 5.0378*** 5.8603*** 5.6572*** 5.3604*** 
  [0.983] [1.102] [1.238] [1.380] [1.207] [1.466] [1.461] [1.729] [1.955] [1.852] [1.194] [1.391] [1.335] [1.366] [1.293] 
Treatment -0.2897 -0.1893 -0.3586 -0.4159 -0.187 0.0947 -0.0211 -0.0148 0.0633 0.3579 -0.1763 0.0195 -0.2512 -0.2752 -0.1287 
  [0.207] [0.248] [0.261] [0.268] [0.255] [0.238] [0.268] [0.266] [0.303] [0.325] [0.223] [0.277] [0.248] [0.253] [0.254] 
Period -0.034     -0.2599***     -0.03     
  [0.050]     [0.063]     [0.044]     
Female 0.2007 0.5875** 0.0926 0.2108 -0.0773 -0.191 0.1721 0.3916 -0.0338 0.2298 -0.1908 0.067 -0.2156 -0.2547 -0.3264 
  [0.200] [0.244] [0.253] [0.262] [0.262] [0.266] [0.292] [0.306] [0.339] [0.333] [0.236] [0.293] [0.258] [0.268] [0.254] 
Foreign 0.0486 -0.1639 0.138 0.0334 0.2022 -0.0037 0.295 0.2022 -0.3551 -0.16 0.0805 -0.18 -0.0826 0.3046 0.3196 
  [0.330] [0.385] [0.362] [0.462] [0.405] [0.551] [0.573] [0.582] [0.646] [0.822] [0.395] [0.463] [0.398] [0.469] [0.502] 
Age 0.0161 0.0553 0.02 -0.0117 0.0026 0.1190* 0.1839*** 0.0981 0.081 0.1189 -0.0058 0.0198 -0.0044 -0.0279 -0.0129 
  [0.044] [0.046] [0.049] [0.061] [0.055] [0.069] [0.067] [0.076] [0.084] [0.088] [0.054] [0.060] [0.060] [0.059] [0.060] 
Science 0.1547 0.2481 0.329 -0.1411 0.1814 0.0587 0.4476 -0.1068 -0.2284 0.1203 -0.1032 -0.2253 0.0296 -0.2544 0.0422 
  [0.197] [0.237] [0.249] [0.258] [0.269] [0.250] [0.286] [0.292] [0.317] [0.332] [0.234] [0.280] [0.256] [0.268] [0.257] 
Math_Test 0.0384 -0.2458 0.2138 0.0986 -0.1022 0.5155 0.3357 0.6609 0.532 0.5471 0.2546 0.303 0.1298 0.4248 0.2291 
  [0.301] [0.367] [0.390] [0.343] [0.358] [0.315] [0.385] [0.400] [0.440] [0.429] [0.303] [0.400] [0.337] [0.359] [0.355] 
Math_Test_Mis. -0.4437 0.1449 -0.4645 -0.7035 -0.779 -0.6877 -1.1257 -1.2248 -0.1986 -0.2084 -0.542 -0.5064 -0.3717 -0.6329 -0.7846 
 [0.552] [0.636] [0.754] [0.753] [0.665] [0.727] [0.760] [0.763] [1.066] [0.922] [0.771] [0.818] [0.832] [0.896] [0.838] 
Correct 0.0999*** 0.0957*** 0.0877*** 0.1154*** 0.1004*** 0.0690*** 0.0755*** 0.0594** 0.0890*** 0.0422 0.0571*** 0.0357* 0.0385** 0.0656*** 0.0671*** 
  [0.013] [0.019] [0.018] [0.021] [0.018] [0.016] [0.022] [0.024] [0.026] [0.029] [0.012] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] 
Obs. 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 
No. of subject 160     160     160     
R-squared 
 0.183 0.131 0.193 0.156  0.156 0.098 0.104 0.062  0.03 0.037 0.091 0.091 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least aroused and 9 represents the most 
aroused. Dominance takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant. Correct measures the number of correct summations. For a description of all 
other variables, see notes of Table 2. 
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Table 6: Gender Differences on the Treatment Effect on Satisfaction under Piece-Rate: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance  
  
HAPPINESS AROUSAL DOMINANCE 
  ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant 5.5334*** 6.2747*** 5.6278*** 5.4497*** 5.2103*** 8.7453*** 10.4526*** 8.5985*** 8.8119*** 9.6027*** 5.4250*** 5.0116*** 5.8185*** 5.6056*** 5.2195*** 
  [0.958] [1.110] [1.220] [1.365] [1.189] [1.502] [1.487] [1.749] [1.987] [1.871] [1.189] [1.410] [1.322] [1.380] [1.280] 
Treatment -0.2835 -0.409 -0.32 -0.1988 -0.1944 0.1159 -0.2188 -0.1235 0.3698 0.4609 -0.0326 0.0893 -0.1279 -0.116 0.2343 
  [0.336] [0.446] [0.447] [0.493] [0.423] [0.423] [0.477] [0.506] [0.544] [0.542] [0.402] [0.558] [0.472] [0.475] [0.438] 
Female 0.2058 0.4122 0.1242 0.3877 -0.0833 0.2085 0.0144 0.3023 0.216 0.3132 0.0726 0.1227 -0.1143 -0.1249 -0.0321 
  [0.286] [0.321] [0.386] [0.412] [0.351] [0.393] [0.439] [0.469] [0.527] [0.485] [0.387] [0.507] [0.457] [0.419] [0.412] 
FemalexTreat. -0.0097 0.3324 -0.0598 -0.3389 0.0116 -0.0334 0.2992 0.1685 -0.4785 -0.161 -0.2269 -0.1056 -0.1912 -0.2486 -0.5677 
  [0.420] [0.501] [0.564] [0.575] [0.519] [0.507] [0.572] [0.589] [0.651] [0.677] [0.485] [0.627] [0.563] [0.551] [0.530] 
Period -0.0339     -0.2596***     -0.0287     
  [0.050]     [0.063]     [0.044]     
Correct 0.0999*** 0.0993*** 0.0872*** 0.1129*** 0.1005*** 0.0689*** 0.0787*** 0.0610** 0.0854*** 0.041 0.0565*** 0.0345* 0.0367* 0.0637*** 0.0629*** 
  [0.013] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.018] [0.016] [0.022] [0.025] [0.026] [0.029] [0.012] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] 
                
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 640 160 160 160 160 
No. of subject 160         160         160     
R-squared  0.185 0.131 0.195 0.156  0.158 0.098 0.108 0.062  0.031 0.038 0.093 0.099 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level.  Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 
represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. Dominance takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant. For a 
description of “Control Variables,” see notes of Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 38
 
 
Table 7: Feedback Content on the Treatment Effect on Satisfaction under Piece-Rate: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance 
  HAPPINESS AROUSAL DOMINANCE 
  ALL PERIOD 2-4 PERIOD 3-4 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 2-4 PERIOD 3-4 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 2-4 PERIOD 3-4 PERIOD 4 
Constant 5.8266*** 5.9528*** 5.6189*** 5.9565*** 2.1738 2.8569* 3.7865** 1.2124 6.2882*** 6.4984*** 6.5623*** 6.1740*** 
  [0.969] [1.068] [1.154] [1.232] [1.427] [1.602] [1.726] [1.746] [1.238] [1.232] [1.274] [1.257] 
Treatment -0.3126 -0.5838* -0.6745* -0.3735 0.1333 0.321 0.2185 -0.3301 -0.2083 -0.3857 -0.6186* -0.8315* 
  [0.254] [0.324] [0.363] [0.515] [0.250] [0.351] [0.382] [0.550] [0.255] [0.295] [0.317] [0.456] 
Positive 0.3851** 0.1577 0.4537** 0.7087* 0.3657** 0.5721** 0.3825 -0.2688 0.1777 0.1529 0.0688 0.2688 
  [0.164] [0.194] [0.187] [0.387] [0.184] [0.272] [0.271] [0.490] [0.131] [0.206] [0.159] [0.407] 
PositivexTreatment 0.4946** 0.7301** 0.9138*** 0.5549 0.2322 -0.0679 0.1836 1.1379* 0.3203* 0.4474* 0.8536*** 1.2412** 
  [0.246] [0.335] [0.335] [0.580] [0.259] [0.388] [0.418] [0.681] [0.187] [0.257] [0.278] [0.543] 
Period 0.0820* 0.1603*** 0.2380**   -0.1866*** -0.3093*** -0.5293***   0.0398 0.0421 0.0378  
  [0.045] [0.060] [0.111]   [0.057] [0.070] [0.126]   [0.038] [0.039] [0.079]   
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 640 480 320 160 640 480 320 160 640 480 320 160 
Number of subject 160 160 160   160 160 160   160 160 160   
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level.  Happiness takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents the least happy and 9 represents the most happy. Arousal takes values 1 to 9, where 1 
represents least aroused and 9 represents the most aroused. Dominance takes values 1 to 9, where 1 represents least dominant and 9 represents the most dominant. The 
variable Positive refers to being above average or improving performance. For a description of “Control Variables,” see notes of Table 2. 
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Table 8: Treatment Effect on Performance under Flat-Rate  
  Correct Quality 
  ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant -1.1144 5.0355 1.3366 2.7628 6.0615 0.6398*** 0.6889*** 0.5630*** 0.6627*** 0.7316*** 
  [4.140] [4.087] [4.710] [4.628] [4.342] [0.081] [0.105] [0.114] [0.105] [0.071] 
Treatment -0.0381 -0.3375 0.7478 -0.5104 -0.0522 -0.0128 0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0433** -0.0079 
  [0.946] [0.954] [1.025] [1.064] [1.052] [0.017] [0.025] [0.023] [0.022] [0.018] 
Period 1.9654***         0.0087**         
  [0.112]         [0.004]         
Female -1.3298 -1.3982 -1.4034 -0.9758 -1.5417 0.0048 -0.0051 0.015 0.0143 -0.0048 
  [1.007] [1.012] [1.110] [1.138] [1.104] [0.019] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024] [0.018] 
Foreign 1.2651 1.2808 0.6129 1.3183 1.8484 0.0432** 0.0173 0.0818*** 0.038 0.0358 
  [1.457] [1.780] [1.567] [1.631] [1.579] [0.020] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.022] 
Age 0.5566*** 0.3880** 0.6402*** 0.6555*** 0.5425*** 0.0465** 0.0781** 0.0292 0.039 0.0398* 
  [0.173] [0.168] [0.194] [0.196] [0.182] [0.021] [0.032] [0.030] [0.025] [0.024] 
Science 1.8667* 1.4992 1.8632 1.9666 2.1377* 0.0073** 0.0056 0.0108** 0.0080* 0.0047 
  [1.086] [1.036] [1.157] [1.247] [1.244] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Math_Test 2.1871 0.9973 2.3826* 2.6900* 2.6785* 0.0268 0.0209 0.0249 0.0304 0.0311 
  [1.337] [1.300] [1.376] [1.525] [1.505] [0.026] [0.034] [0.034] [0.032] [0.027] 
Observations 624 156 156 156 156   624 156 156 156 
No. of subject 156         156         
R-squared   0.071 0.119 0.118 0.118   156 0.035 0.105 0.079 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. For a description of all other variables, see notes of Table 2. Note that all subjects report whether they took the Math test. 
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Table 9: Gender Differences in the Treatment Effect on Performance under Flat-Rate  
  Correct Quality 
  ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PERIOD 3 PERIOD 4 
Constant -1.7211 4.6744 0.7559 1.9064 5.4328 0.6338*** 0.6882*** 0.5569*** 0.6546*** 0.7222*** 
  [4.353] [4.200] [4.938] [4.879] [4.600] [0.083] [0.107] [0.115] [0.109] [0.073] 
Treatment 2.3486 1.083 3.0321* 2.8584* 2.4208 0.011 0.0117 0.0148 -0.0117 0.0291 
  [1.503] [1.509] [1.708] [1.700] [1.600] [0.027] [0.039] [0.040] [0.035] [0.024] 
Female 0.6576 -0.2154 0.4987 1.8295 0.5176 0.0246 -0.003 0.0349 0.0406 0.026 
  
[1.361] [1.329] [1.471] [1.519] [1.537] [0.024] [0.039] [0.033] [0.031] [0.022] 
FemalexTreatment -4.0691** -2.4218 -3.8945* -5.7436*** -4.2163** -0.0405 -0.0043 -0.0408 -0.0539 -0.0631* 
  [1.930] [1.939] [2.171] [2.154] [2.122] [0.037] [0.052] [0.053] [0.047] [0.037] 
Period 1.9654***         0.0087**   
      
  [0.112]         [0.004]   
      
                      
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 624 156 156 156 156 624 156 156 156 156 
No. of subject 156         156         
R-squared   0.081 0.139 0.16 0.141   0.035 0.109 0.087 0.084 
Notes: Robust standard errors at the session level are shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. For a description of “Control Variables,” see notes of Table 2. 
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Table 10: Feedback Content on the Treatment Effect on Satisfaction under Flat-Rate: Happiness, Arousal, Dominance 
  HAPPINESS AROUSAL DOMINANCE 
  ALL PERIOD 2-4 PERIOD 3-4 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 2-4 PERIOD 3-4 PERIOD 4 ALL PERIOD 2-4 PERIOD 3-4 PERIOD 4 
Constant 6.4833*** 5.9193*** 5.8019*** 6.2462*** 4.7865*** 4.2996*** 3.8965*** 2.4061* 7.3387*** 6.8193*** 6.3606*** 6.8641*** 
  [1.008] [1.164] [1.260] [1.360] [1.165] [1.329] [1.387] [1.358] [0.914] [0.943] [0.935] [1.198] 
Treatment 0.0589 -0.2235 -0.1504 0.0484 -0.2035 -0.4216 -0.5102 0.0611 -0.2332 -0.3385 -0.2067 -0.4226 
  [0.268] [0.355] [0.381] [0.489] [0.300] [0.389] [0.416] [0.488] [0.254] [0.278] [0.295] [0.431] 
Positive 0.7005*** 0.4328* 0.8774*** 1.1768*** 0.1718 -0.1319 -0.2999 0.2208 0.3097** -0.0015 0.2753 0.1443 
  [0.161] [0.253] [0.275] [0.431] [0.238] [0.282] [0.343] [0.430] [0.129] [0.144] [0.230] [0.379] 
PositivexTreatment -0.0937 0.2532 0.0344 -0.1521 -0.1062 0.1791 0.2912 -0.6221 0.0104 0.1796 -0.135 0.4683 
  [0.201] [0.349] [0.388] [0.605] [0.315] [0.409] [0.459] [0.604] [0.173] [0.219] [0.277] [0.533] 
Period -0.0990** 0.0178 0.0166   -0.0416 -0.0949 -0.1617   -0.0597* 0.0123 0.1420*   
  [0.048] [0.064] [0.100]   [0.056] [0.059] [0.100]   [0.033] [0.047] [0.076]   
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 624 468 312 156 624 468 312 156 624 468 312 156 
No. of subject 156 156 156   156 156 156   156 156 156   
Notes: Robust standard errors at the subject and session level are shown in brackets. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level.  For a description of “Control Variables,” see notes of Table 2.
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Appendix 
Instructions and the questionnaire were identical for the control and treated groups, 
except for the parts shown in bold, which appeared only in the treatment group.  
A. Instructions: 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR EXPERIMENT! 
 
This is an experiment and, thus, no talking, looking around or walking around is allowed. If you 
have any question or need help, please raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist 
you. If you do not comply with the rules, WE WILL ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE 
EXPERIMENT AND YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT. Thank you. 
 
This experiment is about individual decisions. Pompeu Fabra University has provided funds to 
carry it out. You will receive 3 euros for having arrived on time. Additionally, if you follow the 
instructions correctly, you may earn more money. 
 
These instructions will inform you about the type of decisions you will be taking, as well as 
how your decisions will affect your payment. Everything you earn will be for you and paid in 
cash inside a closed envelope in a strictly private way at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Each participant has been given an "Experiment Code" to guarantee that no participant can 
identify another one by his/her decisions or earnings. Researchers will observe each 
participant’s earnings at the end of the experiment, but we will not associate your decisions with 
any participants’ names.  
 
Your Experiment Code is:  
 
This experiment consists of four periods. Your final payment will be the sum of a participation 
fee of 3 euros plus whatever you earn in the four periods of the experiment. 
 
Each period lasts 5 minutes. During this time you will be shown summations of four numbers of 
two digits each.  
For example: 
12 
59 
40 
25 
------- 
 
 
OK 
The right solution is 136. 
  
The summations will appear one by one and you will have to submit an answer in the indicated 
box. Using a calculator or paper and pencil for doing the summations is totally prohibited. If 
you do not comply with this rule, we will ask you to leave the experiment and you will not 
receive any payment. When you have solved a summation, you can submit the solution and 
click on “OK.” The numbers in the summations, as well as the order in which they appear, will 
be exactly the same for all participants. In each period, you can solve as many summations as 
you can for the duration of the 5-minute time period.  
 
You will be paid exactly 0.15 euros (15 cents) for each correct solution.  
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Thus, if you solve 1 summation correctly in the four periods, you will earn a total of 3.15 euros 
(3 euros as a show-up fee plus 0.15 euros for the correct solution).  
 
Thus, if you solve 25 summations correctly in the four periods, you will earn a total of 6.75 
euros (3 euros as a show-up fee plus 25*0.15=3.75 euros for the correct solutions).  
 
Thus, if you solve 110 summations correctly in the four periods, you will earn a total of 19.5 
euros (3 euros as a show-up fee plus 110*0.15=16. 5 euros for the correct solutions).  
 
Notice that the numbers in the examples are used for illustrative purposes. They DO NOT 
intend to suggest how many summations anyone should solve correctly.  
 
Between the periods, you can rest for two minutes. During this time, you will be informed about 
the number of correctly solved summations during that period, as well as about the average 
number of correctly solved summations in the experimental session. Also, we will ask you 
to answer a brief questionnaire of three questions.  
 
At the end of the 4 periods, you will be shown your total earnings for this experiment, as well as 
the average earnings in this experimental session, and we will ask you to fill in a 
questionnaire, as well as the information for the receipt. Wait for your Experiment Code to be 
called for you to come to the experimenter’s room in order to receive the envelope with your 
earnings.  
 
Thank you for your participation in our experiment! 
 
B. Questionnaire: 
 
A. Please, fill in the following information: 
Gender 
First Language 
Field of Study 
Year of Study 
Age 
Nationality 
 
B. Questions: 
1. Did you participate in similar experiments? If your answer is positive, please explain. 
 
2. I am satisfied with the experience of having participated in this experiment. 
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
3. I am satisfied with the payment that I obtained in this experiment. 
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
4. I would consider participating again in this experiment. 
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a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
5. I value positively the information I obtained at the end of each period with respect to the 
number of summations I solved correctly.  
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
6. I value positively the information I obtained at the end of each period with respect to the 
average number of correct summations solved in this experimental session.  
a. In total disagreement 
b. In disagreement 
c. Neither in disagreement nor agreement 
d. In agreement 
e. In total agreement 
 
7. Did you take the Math exam during Selectividad? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
8. What grade did you obtain in your Math exam during Selectividad? 
 
 
